Finite state Markov decision models with average reward criteria  by Feinberg, Eugene A. & Park, Haechurl
Stochastic Processes and their Applications 49 ( 1994) 159-l 77 
North-Holland 
159 
Finite state Markov decision models with 
average reward criteria 
Received I7 August I990 
Revised 25 June I99 I ; I5 October 199 I ; 9 February 1993 
This paper deal\ with a discrete time Markov decision model with a finite state space, arbitrary action space, and 
bounded reward function under the average reward criteria. We conaider four average reward criteria and prove 
the existence of persistently nearly optimal strategies in various classes of strategies for models with complete 
state information. We show that such strategies exist in any clas\ of strategies satisfying the fbllowing condition: 
along any trajectory at different epochs the controller knows different information about the past. Though neither 
optimal nor stationary nearly optitnal strategies may exist. we show that for some nonempty set of states the 
described nearly optimal strategies may be chosen either stationary or optimal. 
Markov decision models * average reward criteria * persistently nearly optimal strategies * Markov strategies 
* stationary strategies * non-repeating condition 
1. Introduction 
The paper deals with a discrete time Markov decision model with an infinite horizon. We 
consider a finite state model with arbitrary action sets and average rewards per unit time. 
An example by Dynkin and Yushkevich ( 1979, p. 180) shows that stationary r-optimal 
strategies may not exist for this model. The results by Feinberg ( 1980), Demko and Hill 
( 1984), and Bierth ( 1987) establish the existence of Markov c-optimal strategies. Here we 
investigate the following general question. What information about the past is sufficient for 
the existence of &-optimal strategies in the set of all strategies using this information? In 
other words, what information is sufficient in order to make good decisions? In the case of 
stationary strategies, the only available information is the current state of the model. For 
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Markov strategies, at any epoch the current state and time are known. We consider com- 
pletely observable models. This means that for any strategy at any epoch the available 
information includes the current state. We show (Theorem 3.1) that if for any trajectory at 
any epoch, the available information about the past differs from available information at 
any other epoch, then there exist &-optimal strategies using this information. In view of this 
result, Markov &-optimal strategies exist because the time parameter changes. However, by 
similar reasons, there are numerous classes of strategies where &-optimal strategies exist. 
The related results were proved by Feinberg ( 1986, 1987) for countable state dynamic 
programming problems. We also show that, for some initial states, there exist stationary E- 
optimal strategies and for those initial states there exist optimal strategies in any class of 
strategies using at any trajectory different information at different epochs (Theorems 4.8, 
4.9). For communicating models, such strategies exist for all initial states (Corollary 4.5). 
We consider an infinite horizon discrete time Markov decision model with average reward 
criteria. The model is defined by (X, A, A( . ), p,,,( a), r,(a) }, where 
(i ) X is a finite state space; 
(ii) A is an action space. We assume that A is a standard Bore1 space, i.e., a nonempty 
Bore1 subset of some Polish space endowed with the o-field of Bore1 subsets of A; 
(iii) A(x) is a set of actions available in the state x E X. For each x~X the set A(x) is 
a Bore1 subset of A; 
(iv) p,,,.(a) is a one-step transition probability from x E X to y E X, when an action 
u E A(x) is chosen. For each x, y E X the function p,,(a) is nonnegative and measurable in 
Ada, and C ,,ex~.r,,(~) = 1 foreachxEXandaEA(X); 
(v) v,(a) is a one-step (possibly negative) reward received if the action a E A(X) is 
chosen in state XGX. For each x the function r, is assumed to be bounded and Borel. 
Let H,, =X X (A XX)” be the space of histories up to the time II = 0, 1, . , cc. Let 
H=lJ (, f ,, < _ H,,. The spaces H,, and H are endowed with p-fields generated by 2x and the 
Bore1 a-field on A. A strategy 7~ is a function that assigns to each prehistory h,,= 
x,,a,,x,. . x,, E H,, , n = 0, 1, . , a probability measure rr( . 1 II,,) on A satisfying the following 
conditions: 
(a) NA(x,,) I$?) = 1. 
(b) The function 7~( B [ . ) is Bore1 on H for any Bore1 subset B of A. 
Let D be the set of all strategies. A strategy rr is called nonrandomized if for each h E H 
the measure rr( ) h) is concentrated at one point. A nonrandomized strategy is defined by 
a Bore1 mapping 4 : H *A such that $( x,,a ,,... x,,) EA(x,,) for any x~,Q...x,,E H, n =O, 
1,. . A nonrandomized strategy $ is called Markov if there is a sequence of mappings 
Q,, :X+A, n=O, 1, . . . . such that $(h,,) = t&,(x,,) for any It,, =xoa ,,.... r,,eH, n=O, 1, . . . . 
A Markov strategy $ is called stationary if I&,(X) = G(x) for any n = 0, 1, . . and x E X. 
Each pair (x, rr) defines a probability measure P_T on H,, where x E X is an initial state 
and TE nis a strategy. We denote by E,: the expectation with respect to P :. 
For all x E X and n-c IT we consider four average reward criteria as follows: 
V*(x, r) =lim sup E,” 
,I - = 
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V, (x, 7~) = lim inf E, 
,1 - = 
T[i’:< ry,(ar)]3 
lJ*(x, 7~) = E.,” lim sup k ‘1;: r,,(a,) 
[ 1 
, 
n 4 zc 
U, (x, n-) =E: li,r”_inf f ‘i’ I,,(a,)] . 
f = 0 
For all x E X, we denote 
v*(x) = sup V”(x, 7T), v, (x) = sup v, (x3 7T) , 
?TEfT rr-sr? 
u*(x) = sup U”*(x, n), U*(x) = sup u* (x, n) . 
rtll ?rE If 
Fatou’ s Lemma implies that U * (x, %-TT) Q V, (x, n-) Q V* (x, n-) G U* (x, T) Therefore, 
in a general situation U, (x) ,< V, (x) Q V*(x) < U*(x). If the state space is finite, ine- 
qualities may be replaced by equalities in the last formula. Derman ( 1964, 1970) proved 
that V, ( ) = V*( . ) for models with finite state and action sets. Feinberg ( 1980) proved 
this equality for models with finite state and arbitrary action sets. Bierth ( 1987) proved that 
U, ( . ) = U*( . ) for models with finite state and arbitrary action sets. So we will write 
W( .) instead of V, ( .), V*( .), U, ( .) or U*( .). If U, (x, n) = U*(x, 7r) for some x 
and n-, then we will write W(x, n) for each of these four criteria. 
Let E> 0 be a constant. A strategy 7r is called c-optimal for the criterion G if 
G(x,7~)>G(x)-&foranyx~X,whereG=V*,V~, U* or (I,. It is possible (Chapter 7, 
Example 2 in Dynkin and Yushkevich, 1979) that for any of these criteria and for some 
E> 0 there is no stationary &-optimal strategy. 
Definition 1.1. A strategy 4 is called c-optimal for E> 0 if for any XEX the following two 
conditions hold: 
(a) U, (n, 4) = U*(x, 4). 
(b) W(x, 4) 3 W(x) -E. 
A O-optimal policy is called optimal. 
Feinberg ( 1980) proved that there exists a Markov strategy 9 such that V, (x, I,!J) = 
V* (x, IJI) > V*(x) - E for any x E X. Bierth ( 1987) proved that for any E > 0 there exists a 
Markov &-optimal strategy. For special reward functions this result was proved by Demko 
and Hill ( 1984). 
This paper investigates the following question for the described model: what kind of 
information about the history of the process is needed to choose &-optimal strategies. This 
question is central for Markov decision models. The described results by Bierth ( 1987), 
Demko and Hill ( 1984), and Feinberg ( 1980) on the existence of good Markov strategies 
imply that it is sufficient to know the current state of the model and the time. We show that 
it is sufficient to know the current state and any information about the past if this information 
satisfies the so-called Non-Repeating Condition. This condition means that along any tra- 
jectory at different epochs the information about the history is different. Furthermore, we 
show that though neither optimal nor stationary E-optimal strategies may exist, for some 
states these E-optimal strategies may be chosen either optimal or stationary. 
Feinberg ( 1986, 1987) and Feinberg and Sonin ( 1985) introduced the notion of (f; B)- 
generated strategies. Various classes of strategies may be described by this notion. Let B be 
a finite or countable set and f: H + B be a Bore1 mapping. A nonrandomized strategy ti is 
called (A B)-generated if there exists a mapping *:Xx B +A such that $( h,,) = 
9(x,,, f( h,,) ) for any h,, =x,,ao.. .x,, E H, n = 0, 1, . . . In this definition B denotes the set of 
the possible information available about the past for a given class of strategies and,f( h,,) is 
the information available about history h,,. 
The following condition on f was introduced in Feinberg ( 1986, 1987) : 
Condition 1.2 (Non-Repeating Condition (NRC) ). For any two prehistories h,, E H,, and 
h,,, E H ,,,. n, m = 0, 1, . . . such that m > n, h,,, = h,,n,$,x,, +  . . .x ,,,, h,, = ~,,a,,. . x,,, and x,,, = x,,, 
one has.,f’(h,,) +f(h,,,). 
We note that if functionfsatisfies the NRC then B is infinite. Various examples of classes 
of (f, B) -generated strategies are given by Feinberg and Sonin ( 1985 ) and Feinberg ( 1986, 
1987). In fact, any class of strategies, considered in the literature for Markov decision 
models, may be represented as a set of (f, B)-generated strategies for somefand B. In order 
to make this section self-contained, we give here two examples: stationary strategies and 
F-strategies. For stationary strategies one may set B = (0)) f: H + B. Then any stationary 
strategy is (f, B)-generated and vice versa. Of course, stationary strategies may not be 
represented as (f, B)-generated strategies forf satisfying the NRC. 
Another example is an F-strategy. Let F: X ---) 2’ be some mapping such that x E F(x) 
for any XEX. Let B= { 1, 2, . ..) and f(h,,) =C:‘=,,l(x, EF(x,,)), where h,, = 
,q,a,,x, a,. . x,,, n = 0, I, . . Given these f’and B, an (J; B) -generated strategy is called an 
F-strategy; Feinberg ( 1986, 1987). In other words, a strategy is called F-strategy if at each 
epoch the decision depends on the current state x and the number of previous visits to F(x). 
A strategy is Markov if and only if it is an F-strategy for F(x) =X. Hill ( 1979) introduced 
the notion of a tracking strategy. For a tracking strategy, each decision depends on the 
current state and the number of previous visits to this state. It seems that for models in 
which each state has its own memory, this notion is as natural as the notion of a Markov 
strategy for a usual model. A strategy is tracking if and only if it is an F-strategy for F(x) =x, 
x E X. Since x E F(x) for any x E X, F-strategies satisfy the NRC. Therefore, Markov and 
tracking strategies are examples of (J B)-generated strategies with f satisfying the NRC. 
Other examples of classes of (5 B)-generated strategies with f satisfying this condition 
were given in Feinberg ( 1986, 1987). 
In Section 3 of this paper we prove the existence of c-optimal strategies in any class of 
(f, B)-generated strategies with f satisfying the NRC (Theorem 3.1). In Section 4 we first 
consider communicating models. We prove that for these models there exist E-optimal 
stationary strategies. We also show that for these models there exist optimal strategies in 
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arbitrary classes of (f, B)-generated strategies with f satisfying the NRC. Then, by using 
Bather’s classification of states and Theorem 3.1, we prove that for an arbitrary model there 
exists a nonempty subset Y of the state space such that for any class of (A B)-generated 
strategies withf satisfying the NRC, there exists an s-optimal strategy from this class which 
is either stationary on Y or optimal on Y. The results of Section 3 extend the results on the 
existence of good Markov strategies (Bierth, 1987) to various classes of nonstationary 
strategies. The results of Section 4 are new even for Markov strategies. 
Although we discuss the existence of nearly optimal strategies in the introduction, we 
prove the existence of persistently nearly optimal strategies in this paper. The notion of 
persistently near optimality is stronger than near optimality. For gambling models persist- 
ently nearly optimal strategies were introduced by Dubins and Sudderth ( 1977). 
We note that the results of this paper for finite state models with average rewards are 
parallel in some sense to the known results for countable state Markov decision models 
with the expected total rewards. In those models for each class of (f‘, B)-generated strategies 
with f satisfying the NRC, there exist uniformly nearly optimal strategies from this class 
and these strategies may be chosen stationary on some subset of the state space; Feinberg 
( 1986, 1987). This subset may be chosen large enough. For example, all states for which 
the value function is not equal to 0 and all states for which there exist conserving actions 
may be included in this subset. This result implies various known results, including results 
on the existence of good strategies in positive and negative programming and on the 
existence of Markov strategies in countable models with the expected total reward criterion; 
van der Wal ( 1983). It also implies the validity of the conjecture by van der Wal and 
Wessels ( 1984) on the existence of nearly optimal tracking strategies in a countable state 
model with the expected total reward criterion. 
We note that if the state space is countable, many of the above mentioned results for the 
average reward criteria do not hold even for models with bounded reward functions. For 
instance, a simple example shows that it is possible that I/, (x) < V, (x) < V*(x) < 
U*(x) for some X. We remind the reader that for any initial state and any initial strategy 
there exists a randomized Markov strategy with the same one-dimensional marginal distri- 
butions; Derman and Strauch ( 1966). Therefore, for each of the criteria V, and V*, for 
any initial state, and for any E> 0 there exists a randomized Markov &-optimal strategy. For 
criteria V, and V* there may not exist uniformly &-optimal randomized Markov strategies; 
Feinberg ( 1980). For criterion V* and for a given initial state there exist Markov &-optimal 
strategies; Feinberg ( 1982). But for criterion V, such strategies may not exist; Dynkin and 
Yushkevich ( 1979, p. 182). For criteria U *, V*, and U*, given an initial state for any 
randomized Markov strategy there exists a Markov strategy with the same or better per- 
formance; Feinberg ( 1982), Hill and Pestien (1986). This result follows from the integral 
representation of a strategic measure for a randomized Markov strategy by strategic meas- 
ures for Markov ones. The similar representation holds for any class of (A B)-generated 
strategies with f satisfying the NRC; Feinberg ( 1986, 1987). Therefore, for criteria U *, 
V*, and U*, given an initial state for any randomized (5 B)-generated strategy with S 
satisfying the NRC, there exists a nonrandomized strategy of this kind with the same or 
better performance. If the state space is countable, the existence of Markov &-optimal 
strategies for criteria U * and CI” is an open problem. It seems that this problem is at least 
as difficult as Hill’s ( 1979) problem on the existence of E-optimal Markov strategies for 
countable state gambling models; see also Hill and Pestien ( 1986). We note that, for 
uncountable state models, the integral representation of a strategic measure through strategic 
measures for nonrandomized strategies from the same class holds, if the class of strategies 
satisfies a condition which is stronger than the NRC; Feinberg ( 1992). This stronger 
condition coincides with the NRC for countable state models. For uncountable state models, 
the validity of such representation for any class of strategies atisfying the NRC is an open 
question. 
2. Preliminary results 
For a signed measure p defined on some measurable space, we denote by [( ~(1 the variation 
of this measure. Let (X,, .F, ) and (X,, .F-,> be two measurable spaces, I_L be a signed 
measure on (X, , .F, ) and v ( ( ) be a regular transition signed measure from (X, , .F, ) 
into (XL, .Y2). We denote by p X v the measure on (X, XX,, .F, X .FZ) defined by 
/LX v(AXB) = v(~lx)p(du) forAE.F”,, BE.F~. 
A 
Lemma 2.1. Let X and Y be two Bore1 spuces. Let P (‘I PC-?) be two probability measuws , 
onXandP”’ . ( 1 ), PC4’( . 1 . ) be two regular transition probability measuwsfrom X into 
Y. Then 
((P”‘XP C2) - Pt3) x P@)j( (XX Y) 
< I(P(‘)-P(3)I((x)+P(3)x (lP(2)-P(4)(((xxY) 
Proof. By Dubins and Freedman ( 1964, Theorem 2.8) if k( . ) . ) is a signed regular 
conditional measure, then )I ~1) ( . ) ) is also a regular conditional measure. So we have 
IJP(‘)xP”‘-P’3)xP(4)IJ(xxY) 
<lJI(P”‘_ P(3)) xP’2’I((xxY) + (IP(3)X(P(2)-P(4)I((XXY) 
<I(P(‘)- P(3)JI XP”‘(XX Y) +P(‘)xJIP(2)-P(4’(1(xxY) 
<l((PC’)- P’3)(((x)+P(3)x I(P’2’-P(4)(((xxY) . q 
For two nonrandomized strategies 4, Ic, and for a finite history h,, =~,,a,,. . . x,, E H, n = 
0, 1, . . . . wedefine 
= IIPw(4(k,)) -P,,,.(#(h,,))l) (2.1) 
Definition 2.2. For a strategy rr~ Zl and a history h,, =,x~,(I,,x’, .x,,a,, EH,, = (XXA)“+ ‘, 
n = 0, I, . . . , we define the shifted strategy i,, r as the use of rr preceded by h;, Namely, 
h,, r= u and for any history hi,, = xba; ,... xi,, E (XXA)“‘XX. m=O, 1, . . . . we have 
a(. lh~‘,,) = G-(. I&h:,,), where h,,h’ ,,1 =.~()a,, ..x,,a,,x~,a~~ . . .x:,, We also define k , = 0 and 
037= %-. 
We have from (2.1) that for any two nonrandomized strategies 4 and I,!J, 
E’~~( hi,,) = c&“( &, h;,,) , (2.2) 
where a=h”,,4, y=h;,r+!Jandn,m=O, 1, . . . . 
Let X,, = X” + ’ for n = 0, 1, and X, =Xx where L”’ is a Cartesian product of m sets L 
for any set L and m=l, 2, . . . . x. On the sets X,, we consider Bore1 o-fields 3,,, II= 
0. I. ., m, which are products of u-fields 2x. 
Lemma 2.3. For any n = I, 2, . . and,for any two nonrandomized strategies 4 and I/J, 
Proof. For n = 1 one has 
Let the lemma hold for some n = 1,2, . Then we have for a=x&x) 4 and y=x&x) I+? 
<.Efd~“‘(x,,) +E$E; C Py(hX) =E: i c&“(hk) 
k = 0 k = 0 
(The first inequality follows from Lemma 2.1; the second one follows from the induction 
assumption; the equality follows from (2.2).) 17 
Lemma 2.4. For any tu’o nonrandomized strategies 4 and I/J, 
IIP$-P:JI(X,) <2Ef e s’.@(h,), xex. 
h=O 
Proof. Let _9,,, n = 1, 2, . . . . be the set of n-dimensional cylinder sets, A?,,= { CEB,: 
C = C’ XX,, C’ E X,, _ , ), and .P = l_J ,:=, _9,, be the set of finite dimensional cylinder sets. 
Let C E %, and x E X. If p is a measure on (X,, .%J then for any E> 0 there exists 
Co E 9 such that p( CAC,,) < E; Halmos ( 1965, Theorem 13.D). Let p= P.$ + Pf. Then 
there exists a sequence (C,, E P,,}z=, such that k( C,,) ++ F(C) as II --) ~0. Therefore. for 
rr= 4 and for 7~= 4, 
P,:(C) = lim P:(C,,) 
,1 - = 
Wehaveforrz=1,2,..., 
lP’(C) -MC) I = I (P’(C) -P?CC,,>) + (P?(G) -P:(c)) 
+ (~‘(C,,) -Y?(C)) I * 
Since C,, = C:, XX,, where Ci, CX,,, then (2.3) and (2.4) imply 
lP$(C) -P?(C) I = lim IMC,,) -P,!TC,) I 
II - = 
Thus, 
= lim IP~$(C:,) -P$(C:,)) G lim llP$-P$(((X,,) 
,1-x II 4 Z 
IIP$-P!ll(X,) <2 sup (P’(C) -P?(C) ( 
CE nx 
(2.3) 
(2.4) 
(2.5) 
~2 lim IIPT-PrI((X,,) <2E? 2 cs.@(hk) . 
,I - r x=0 
(The first inequality follows from Dunford and Schwarz (1965, Chapter III, ( 1.5)); the 
second one follows from (2.5); the third one follows from Lemma 2.3.) q 
Corollary 2.5. Let c$ and IJI be nonrandomized strategies such that 4( hk) = 4( hk) when 
k < n for some n. Then 
Proof. Note that cc.@( hk) = 0 for k < n. The corollary follows from Lemma 2.4. Cl 
Lemma 2.6. Let 4 be an (A B) -generated strategy. Let q!~= &# for some & E 
(XxA)“+‘, k = 0, 1, . Then for the measurable mapping f ‘, where j” ‘(h,,) =f( h-,h,,), 
the strategy I/I is (f ‘, B) -generated. Iff satisfies the NRC, then f’ also satisfies the NRC. 
Proof. We have 
$(h,,) =~(~~h,,)=~(x,,,f(~~h,,))=~(x,,,f’(h,~)) . (2.6) 
Let h,,,=h,,a,,x,,+ ,... x,,, and x,,,=x,,, where h,,=xoaox,a ,... x,,. Then &h,,,= 
6.h x A ,,a,, ,,+, . .x,,, and hencef( &h,,,) #,f( hkh,,). So, we have 
f’(k) =fv&,,) emh,,) =f’(h,,) 0 
Let C$ be an (f; B) -generated strategy. Let I/J= & 4 for some &. We consider a measurable 
mapping f’(h,,) =f(&,h,,), where h,, =.q+++, a, . ..x.,. By Lemma 2.6 the strategy 9 is 
(f’, B)-generated. As in section 1, we denote by rC, a mapping from XX B to A such 
that $(x,,, f“(U) = $(h,,) for any h,,. In view of (2.6) we have that the mapping 
$1 XX B +A may be defined as 
I,!J(x, b)=qMx, b) forxEX, bEB. (2.7) 
Definition 2.7 (Feinberg, 1980). Two Markov decision models {X, A, A ( . ), p, r) and 
(X, A’, A’( . ), p’, r’) with the same state space X are called isomorphic if, for any XEX, 
where exists a one-to-one Bore1 mapping T, of the set A(x) onto A’(x) such that 
~{.~(T,(cr))=p,,,(a) andr:(T,(a))=r,(a) foranyuEA(.x) andyEX. 
Lemma 2.8 (Feinberg, 1980, Lemma 2). For any Markot~ decision model sntisfiing con- 
ditions (i)-(v) there exists an isomorphic Murkot, decision model (X, A ‘, A ‘( . ) , p ‘, r’) 
sutisf&zg conditions (i)-(v) and the following two conditions: 
(a) For any x E X the closure [A ‘(x) J ofA ‘(x) is compact und [A ‘(x) ] GA ‘. 
(b) For all x, y EX the functions r:(u) and p:,(a) are uniformly continuous in 
USA’. 0 
Note that uniformly continuous functions r,: and p :, may be extended from A ‘(x) to 
[A’(x)]. Then r.{.(a) andp{.,.(u) are continuous in UE [A’(x)]. 
3. Persistently nearly optimal strategies 
A strategy 4 is called persistently &-optimal, where F> 0, if this strategy is r-optimal and 
forany& ~g,,, =(XXA)“+‘,n=O, 1, . . . . the strategy ii,, 4 is &-optimal. 
A persistently O-optimal strategy is called persistently optimal. It is obvious that any 
stationary &-optimal strategy is persistently &-optimal. 
We prove the following result in this section. 
Theorem 3.1. Let un arbitrury class of (,J B) -generated strutegies be girlen, where B is a 
countuble set and the measurable muppingf’: H + B satisfies the NRC. Then, for any s> 0 
there exists a persistently e-optimal strategy from this class. 
The proof of the theorem is based on the approximation of a stationary strategy by 
nonstationary ones. When the nonstationary strategies are Markov, this method was used 
by Feinberg ( 1980), Demko and Hill ( 1984), and Bierth ( 1987). In order to implement 
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this method for general classes of strategies described in Theorem 3.1, we need some 
auxiliary results. 
For a stationary strategy s, an (A B)-generated strategy 4, and (x, b) E X x B we define 
E+‘(x> b) = Ilpx (+(x3 b)) -p.,.(s(x))II = C IP,,(~(x, b)) -P.,,.(s(x)) I 
\EX 
Then for h,, = x,a,,x, . . .x,, we have 
E’~‘(h,,) =@‘(x,,,f(h,,)) (3.1) 
Lemma 3.2 (cp. Bierth, 1987, Lemma 3.2). Let B be a countable set and f: H --) B be a 
measurable mapping satisbing the NRC. Let s be a stutionary strategy and $J be un (j; B) - 
generated strategy such thutfor some S>, 0, 
c &‘(x, b) < 6. (3.2) 
(.,.h)EXXS 
Then for any x E X, 
Proof. Let h, =x,,a,,x, .. . E H, and h,, = x,,a,,x, .. .x,,, n = 0, 1, We define b,, =f( h,,) Then 
+( h,,) =4(x,,, b,,). The NRC implies that (x,,, b,,) # (x ,,,, b,,,) for nfm, and n, m=O, 1, 
. So along any trajectory h,, 
f @‘(h,,) = 5 @‘(.x,,, b,,) < C @‘(x, 0) <6, 
,, = 0 ,,=o c r,h) txxrj 
(3.3) 
Lemma 2.4 and (3.3) imply Lemma 3.2. 0 
Lemma 3.3. Let B be a countable set andf: H -+ B be a measurable mupping sati@ing the 
NRC. Let s be a stationary strategy and 4 be an (f, B) -generated strategy such that 
C IY,((~(x,~))-~,(.F(x))~ <x. (3.4) 
(,Y,h) EXXR 
Then for uny h, = x,,a,+c, . E H,, 
lim(r,~,(4(h,,))-r,,,(.~(.~,,))l=O, 
,I - = 
(3.5) 
li,;tfk”c’ r.,,(d(h,,))=li,~~f~"~' r,,,(s(x,,)) , 
1 =(I I =,I 
lim sup t ‘Icl r,,,($(h,)) =limsup .! “5’ r.,vS(s(x,,)) , 
II - x ‘I-X n .,zo 
(3.6) 
(3.7) 
where h,, = x,a,fi, . . .x,,. 
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Proof. We fix h, =x,a,,r, .. E H,. Let h,, =,~,,a,+~. . .x,, and b,, =f( h,,). Inequality (3.4) 
implies that the set ((x, ~)EXXB: Ir,(&x, b)) -r,(s(x))( >F} is finite for F>O. The 
NRC implies that (x,,, 6,,) # (x,,,, b,,,) when TZ # m. Hence for any E> 0 there exists a finite 
number N, such that 
Ir,,(~(~,,,b,,))-r,,,(~(~,,))l GE fornaN,. 
Since ~,~(&h,,)) =v,,,(+(x,,, h,,) ), equality (3.5) is proved. Equalities (3.6) and (3.7) 
follow from (3.5). 0 
Lemma 3.4. Let B be a countable set andf: H + B be a measurable mapping satisfying the 
NRC. Let s be a stationary strategy and $ be an (& B) -generated strategy such that 
c @‘(x, b) <m. (3.8) 
c 1 ,I, ) G x x n 
and (3.4) holds. Then: 
(A) U*(.x, 4) =U,(x, q5)ftiranyxEX. 
(B)IfW(x,s)=W(y,s)forunvx,y~X,thenW(x,~)=W(x,s)~oranvxEX. 
Proof. (A) Let x, =x,,, x, , . . and 
R(x,) =limsup “‘2’ r,,(s(q)) , 
,7-z fl L=. 
8(x,) = lim inf L “5’ r,,(s(xk) 1 . 
,r - r ‘I h=O 
Lemma 3.3 implies that U*(x, 4) =E:I?(x,) and U, (x, 4) = Ef&(x”). 
For any stationary strategy s’ we have U *( . , s’) = Ii, (., .s’): Bierth (1987), Lemma 
2.1.Therefore,CP(~.s)=U,(~,s)=W(~,s). 
For n = 1, 2, ., we define a strategy v”: 
d’( h,) = 
4(h,) if k<n , 
s(xA) ifk>,n, 
whereh,=x,,a,+ ,... x,EHh,k=O, 1, . . . 
We fix anyxEX. Then for any n=O, I, . . . . 
N-I 
I/*(x. CT”) = E:‘” lim sup a “c’ r,,(a,) = Et”’ N_1 & lim sup 
,++;c 
C r,,(a,) 
t=o , = ,1 
=Ey”E:,, lirn~up~~~’ r,,(q) =EF”U*(x,,, s) =qW(x,,, s) . 
N-I_ f=O 
Similarly, U, (x, (T”) =E$W(x,,, s). So we have for any n =O, 1, . . . . 
U”(x, a”) = u, (x, a”) = W(x, ,“) 
For any n = 1, 2, . ., 
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I U”(x, 4) -u* (x, 4) I G I u*cx, 4) -WC.& a”) 1 
+ I u, (x, cp) - WC-c u”) I (3.9) 
Let h, = xoa(~, .. be an arbitrary history. Let h,, =,~,,a,+, . ..x,, and 6,, =,f(h,,). Then the 
NRC implies that for any trajectory h,, 
and 
Et 5 E&,‘( h,,) <CT . 
,I = 0 
Corollary 2.5 implies that 
By (3.10), 
lim IIPY” -P$(I(Xz) =O. 
n-z 
(3.10) 
(3.11) 
Let \r,(a)l <KforanyxEXandaEA(x).Then 
I U*(x, 4) - W(x, a”) I <K. IIP’\“’ -P.tJI(Xoz) 
The last inequality and ( 3.1 I ) imply 
lim 1 U*(x, qb) - W(x, a”) 1 = 0 
,1 * = 
(3.12) 
Similarly, 
lim (U, (x, 4) - W(x, ~7”) 1 =0 . (3.13) 
II - = 
Letn-,~in(3.9).Then(3.12)and(3.13)implyI/~(x,~)=U,(x,~). 
(B) If W(x, s) is a constant W(s) then for any x=X, 
W(x, a”) =E,$W(x,,, s) =EfW(s) = W(s) 
ForanynandxEX 
I W(x, 4, -W(s) I G I WC4 4) - W(x, a”) 1 + I W(x, a”) - W(s) I 
= 1 W(x, 4) - W(x, 8) ( 
By(3.12)and(3.13)wehavethat IW(x.+)-W(x,o”)I+Oasn+~. Cl 
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let the model satisfy the following two additional conditions: 
(vi) [A(x)] is compact and A(x) GA for anyxEX, 
(vii) r,(a) and p,,.(a) are defined on [A(x)] and continuous in UE [A(x)] for any 
X, 4’EX. 
Lemma 2.8 implies that if Theorem 3.1 holds for models satisfying conditions (i)-( vii) 
then it holds for models satisfying conditions (i)-(v). Let [S] be the set of stationary 
strategies when the sets A(x) are extended to [A(x) ] Then s E [S] is a function s: X +A 
such that s(x) E [A(x)] for anyxEX. We fix E>O. Theorem 2.5 in Bierth (1987) implies 
that there exists a stationary strategy s E [S] such that for any x E X, 
W(x, s) 3 W(x) - 4‘s. (3.14) 
By conditions (vi) and (vii), for any 6> 0 it is possible to choose an (A B)-generated 
strategy+satisfying(3,2)and(3,4).WesetS=.sl(4K) where [r,(a)] <KforanyxEX 
and aEA(x). 
We choose an (J B)-generated strategy 4 satisfying (3.2) and (3.4). For arbitrary 
& E (XXA)“+’ , k = 0, 1, . ., or & = 0. we consider a strategy $= I$ 4. By Lemma 2.6, the 
strategy @is (,f’, B)-generated, where,f ’ satisfies the NRC. By (2.7), the strategy $satisfies 
inequalities (3.2) and (3.4), if #J is replaced by $ in these inequalities. By Lemma 3.4, 
U*(., $)=U*(., 9). 
For any x E X, 
JW(x, ICr)-W(x,s))~I(P~-P:I((X,).K,<2S.K=~&. (3.15) 
(The first inequality follows from the definition of W, the second one follows from Lemma 
3.2.) Finally (3.14) and (3.15) imply that foranyxEX, 
W(x, $12 W(x) --E. 0 
4. Communicating models and good subsets 
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that there exists a constant c and u function h(x), x EX, such that 
c+h(x) = sup r,(a) + C p,,(u)h(y) , XEX. 
<,tA~.r~ \EX > 
(4.1) 
Then: 
(A) For any E> 0 there exists a stationary E-optimal strategy s and W(x) = c for any 
XEX. 
( B) For any countable set B and any measurable mapping f : H + B satisfying the NRC, 
there exists a persistently optimal (A B) -generated strategy. 
Proof. (A) For any E> 0 we consider a stationary strategy s such that for any x EX, 
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r,(.y(x)) + 2 p,,.(s(x) )h(y) 
v E x 
> sup 
{ 
v,(a) + c p,.,(n)h(\:) --F. 
,>=nc 0 VEX > 
(4.2) 
By Dynkin and Yushkevich ( 1979, p. 184)) (4.1) and (4.2) imply that for any x E X, 
V*(x,S)~C-&E)/~~(X)_&, (4.3) 
and 
V*(x)~C~V*(X)+&. (4.4) 
Since (4.3) holds for any F> 0 and V* = V, = W, we have c = W. Note that V, (x, s) = 
I/ * (x, s) = U* (x, s) for any stationary strategy s and x E X (Lemma 2.1 in Bierth, 1987). 
Thus (A) is proved. 
(B) Lemma 2.8 implies that if Theorem 4.1 holds for the models satisfying conditions 
(i)-( vii) then it holds for the models satisfying conditions (i)-(v). We will, therefore, 
consider a model satisfying conditions (i)-( vii). Since [A(x) ] is compact and functions 
T, and p.,, are continuous in (1 E [A(x) 1, where .r, v E X, then there exists a stationary strategy 
s E [S] such that for any x E X, 
c+ h(x) = sup 
‘ltA(.rI { 
r.,(a) + c p,,.(u)h(v) 
VEX > 
= max 
<,t/\(,, { 
r,(a) + c p,.(a)KI,) 
\’ t x I- 
= r,(.dx)) + c p.,,Js(x) )My) . (4.5) 
\-EX 
Equalities (4.5) imply that V, (x, s) = c for any x EX (Chapter 7 in Dynkin and Yushkevich 
( 1979) ) Since I/ * (x, s) = U* (x, s) for any stationary strategy s and x E X, W(x, s) = c 
for any x E X. 
Let 4 be an (f, B)-generated strategy satisfying (3.4) and (3.8). Let +=l&4 for an 
arbitrary & = xouox, .xk or & = 61. Then by Lemma 2.6, $ is an (f ‘, B) -generated strategy 
and ,f’ satisfies the NRC. By (2.7) inequalities (3.4) and (3.8) hold for strategy I,!J. By 
Lemma 3.4, we have U .+ (x, +) = II* (x, I/I) and W( x, I/I) = W( x, s) = c for any x E X. 0 
Definition 4.2 (Bather, 1973; Hordijk, 1974). A subset YEX is called a communicating 
class if p.,,.(a) =0 for all XE Y, ~EX\Y, and Ada and for each pair of states x, YE Y 
there exists a stationary strategy s and a nonnegative integer n such that Pi {x,, = y ) > 0. 
A model is called communicating if X is a communicating class. Other equivalent deti- 
nitions of communicating modes were given by Filar and Schultz ( 1988). 
Suppose we have two Markov decision models (X, A, A( .), p, r} and (X, A, A’( s), 
p, u), where A(x) CA’(~) for any XEX. Then it is obvious that if the first model is com- 
municating then so is the second. 
Bather ( 1973, part II) proved that if a communicating model satisfies conditions (i)- 
(v) and (vii) and if the sets A(x) are compact for any XEX, then 
c+h(x) = max 
{ 
r,(a) + C p,,(a)h(.~) , -4-=X 
Cl‘E/(( I) ,,tx > 
(4.6) 
for some constant c’ and the function h(y), _Y E X. 
Remark 4.3. In addition to conditions (i)-(v) and (vii), it was assumed in Bather ( 1973) 
that actions coincided with vectors of transition probabilities, the sets of actions were convex, 
and functions I-, were concave. But these assumptions were not used in Bather ( 1973) for 
the proof of (4.6). 
Theorem 4.4. !f the model is communicating then there exists a constant c cmd CI ,jimction 
/I(X), x E X, srrtisfiiq (4. I ). 
Proof. By Lemma 2.8 we will consider a model satisfying conditions (i)-( vii). As it was 
noted above, if a model is communicating, then the model (X, A, [A ( . ) J, p, r) is also 
communicating. By Bather ( 1973). equality (4.6) holds for some c and h ifA ( ) is replaced 
by [A( )] in (4.6). By assumptions (vi) and (vii) we have that (4. I ) holds. 0 
Theorems 4. I and 4.4 imply the following result. 
Corollary 4.5. Let the model be c,orllmlcl7ictrting. TI7m: 
( A) W(x) = W(v) ,fiw trn~~ x, yEX. 
( B ) For- an! E > 0 there esists CI strrtiorzav &-optimal .strutegy. 
( C ) For my counttrble set B rmd any rnecrsurclble napping .f : H + B satkfiirzg the NRC 
there exists a persistently optimtrl (j: B) -generated stratr~y~. 0 
We remark that the assertion of Corollary 4.S( C) is unusual for Markov decision models. 
The following proposition was proved for models with the expected total reward criterion 
by Strauch ( 1966), Blackwell ( 1970), Sobel ( 1975). Bertsekac and Shreve ( 1979), and 
van der Wal ( 1984) and was proved for average reward Markov decision models with finite 
state and compact action sets by Feinberg ( 1977) and Bierth ( 1987): if there exists an 
optimal strategy then there exists a stationary optimal strategy. The situation is different for 
average reward communicating Markov decision models with finite state and arbitrary action 
sets. Corollary 4.5(C) asserts the existence of optimal strategies in different classes of 
nonstationary strategies. But the following simple example shows that stationary optimal 
strategies may not exist for these models. 
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Example 4.6. Let X= ( 1) , A = [0, 1) , r,(a)=a.Then W(I)=1 and W(I,s)=s(I)<l 
for any stationary strategy s. 
Definition 4.7. A nonrandomized strategy $J is called stationary on Y, where YCX, if 
4( h,,) = 4(x,,) for any h,, =.q,a,,x, . .x,, such that x,, E Y, n = 0, 1, . 
Bather ( 1973, part III) proved that if the state space is fmite then there exists at least one 
nonempty communicating class Y. The proof of this result in Bather ( 1973) does not use 
any assumption except the finiteness of the state space. 
The following proposition combines the existence of a nonempty communicating class 
with the existence of stationary nearly optimal strategies for models with compactness 
assumptions. 
Theorem 4.8. Let the set A(x) be compact for any XEX, the ,functions p,,(a), XEX, be 
continuous in ueA(x), and thefunction r,(a) he upper semicontinuous in asA( Let Y 
be a communicating class. Thetz,for any E> 0 there exists a stutionaty strategy s such that 
W(x, s) = W(x) for xE Y 
and 
W(x, s) > W(x) -E ,for xGX\Y. 
Proof. By Bierth ( 1987, Theorem 2.5), there exists a stationary strategy s’ such that 
W( x, s’) > W(x) - F for any x E X. By Bather ( 1973), there exists a stationary strategy s” 
such that W( x, s”) = W(x) for any x E Y. Let 
s(x) = 
{ 
s”(x) for xE Y, 
s’(x) for xEX\Y. 
Then W(x, s) = W(x, s”) = W(x) > W(x, s’) forxe Y. 
LetT(h,)=inf{n>O;x,,EY).ThenforxEY, 
W(x, s) = E;.’ .~“)+l(~=~]~~iminf~“~‘r,,(a,) 
1z+-i n r=O > 
I~T=nJ.W(x,~)+lIT=~).liminfI’~~’ r,,( 4) 
?I-= ?I- ,=o > 
1(T=nJ.W(x,,,s’)+l(7=CS~.JiminfI”~’ r.,,(q) 
,1-= n r=cj > 
=W(x,s’)>,W(s)-E. q 
The following theorem generalizes Theorem 3.1 
Theorem 4.9. Let Y be a nonempty communicating claw. For any countable set B, for any 
measurable mapping f : H + B sutisfjing the NRC, and for any F> 0 the following two 
propositions hold: 
(A) There exists a persistently e-optimul (,f B) -generated strategy which is stationary 
on Y. 
(B) There exists a persistently E-optimal (f, B)-generated strategy 4 such that 
W(x, I/J) = W(x),foranyxE Yundfor $E 14) U (&4/h; E (XXA)k”, k=O, 1, . ..}. 
Proof. Let Y be a nonempty communicating class. We fix F> 0. 
(A) By Corollary 4.5(B) there exists a stationary strategy s such that W(x, s) > W(x) 
- i& for XE Y. By Theorem 3. I there exists a persistently $&-optimal (f, B)-generated 
strategy 4’. We define an (f; B) -generated strategy 4, 
&x, b) = 
{ 
s(x) if xE Y, 
4’(x, 6) otherwise . 
Let I+!J=&$ and I/J’=&@ for some h; E (XXA)“+‘, k=O, 1, . . . . or & =@. For any 
h, =x,,u,+,u,. ., we define 7( h,) = inf( n > 0: x,, E Y). From the existence of W(x, s), the 
boundedness of r , and properties of conditional expectations we have for x E X, 
= Et 2 l{T=n).W(x,,, s)+l{T==J.liminfl”c’ r_,,(a,) , 
> 
(4.7) 
II = 0 II-X n ,=,I 
and 
= Ef f l(T=n].W( 
I, = 0 
x,~,s)+*(r=m).limsup~"~' r,,(q) 
,z - = I=0 > 
(4.8) 
Since the strategy 4’ is persistently $&-optimal, U * ( . , 9’) = U*( . , I,!/) = W( , I,!/). It 
means that for any x E X the sequence ( 1 /n) C :I,: I;,( a,) converges P,t-a.s. This and (4.7), 
(4.8) imply that for any XEX, 
I/* (x, $) = U*(& G) = W(x, $) 
We have that for x E X, 
W(x, 4) a-E:‘/ 2 1(7=n)~(W(x,,)-~~)+1(7=~J~lim “‘i’ r,,(a,) 
II =o Jz+l n ,=,) > 
e l(~=n)~W(x,,)+l(~=~)~lim -!“c’~~,(u,) -4~ 
,? = 0 II-m n ,=o 
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f l(r=y1).W(x,,,, h,,_,r,V) 
,z = 0 
+1(7=r-a)~lim “7c’ r,,(a,) -f& 
I?-% n l=,J 1 
=W(x, ly-:&>W(X)-&. 
(The first inequality follows from (4.9) and i&-optimality of s for initial states from Y, 
the third inequality follows from the existence of W( . , h;,_ , $‘), which is guaranteed by 
persistent f &-optimality of 4’. The equality follows from the existence of W( , k,,_ , I,!/) 
and the properties of conditional expectations.) Proposition (A) is proved. 
(B) In view of Lemma 2.8, if the theorem holds for the models satisfying conditions 
(i)-( vii) then it holds for the models satisfying conditions (i)-(v). We consider a model 
satisfying conditions (i)-( vii). 
SinceA(x)G(A(x)] andfunctionsp,,,(a) arecontinuousinuE [A(x)] foranyx,yEX, 
The set Y is a communicating class for the model (X, A, [A( ) 1, p, r). Theorem 4.8 implies 
that there exists a stationary strategy s E [S] such that W(x, s) = W(x) for x E Y and 
W(x, s) 2 W(x) - i&forxEX\Y. 
Let6=&/(2K),where Ir,(a)I<Kforanyx~Xanda~A(x).W’~consideran(,f,B)- 
generated strategy d, satisfying (3.2) and (3.4). As was shown in the proof of Theorem 
3.1, the strategy 4 is persistently &-optimal. Note that (3.2) and (3.4) hold if the summation 
is taken over (x, h) E YXB. Let h; E (XXA)“+‘, k=O, 1, .., or & =@. By Corollary 
4.5(A), we have W(x, s) = W(v, s) for all x, v=Y. Lemma 3.4(B) implies that 
W(x, !7,4) = W(x, s) = W(x) forxe Y. 0 
Remark 4.10. In Theorems 4.8 and 4.9 we define Y as an arbitrary communicating class. 
These results remain true if Y is the union of all communicating classes. The proofs remain 
practically the same. 
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